"A highly relevant and much-needed historical study . . . One of the best books on the period to have been written." --"The Economist"
To the amazement of the public, pundits, and even the policymakers themselves, the ideological and political conflict that endangered the world for half a century came to an end in 1990. How did that happen? What had caused the cold war in the first place, and why did it last as long as it did? To answer these questions, Melvyn P. Leffler homes in on four crucial episodes when American and Soviet leaders considered modulating, avoiding, or ending hostilities and asks why they failed. He then illuminates how Reagan, Bush, and, above all, Gorbachev finally extricated themselves from the policies and mind-sets that had imprisoned their predecessors, and were able to reconfigure Soviet-American relations after decades of confrontation. Melvyn P. Leffler, Stettinius Professor of American History at the University of Virginia, is the author "The Specter of Communism "and "A Preponderance of Power," which won the Bancroft Prize in 1992. He lives in Charlottesville, Virginia.
Winner of the George Louis Beer Prize
Finalist for the Council on Foreign Relations' Arthur Ross Book Award
To the amazement of the public, pundits, and even the policymakers themselves, the ideological and political conflict that had endangered the world for half a century came to an end in 1990. In "For the Soul of Mankind," historian Melvyn P. Leffler offers his interpretations about what caused the Cold War, why it lasted so long, and how it finally came to an end.
The distinguished historian Melvyn P. Leffler homes in on four crucial episodes when American and Soviet leaders considered modulating, avoiding, or ending hostilities and asks why they failed: Stalin and Truman devising new policies after 1945; Malenkov and Eisenhower exploring the chance for peace after Stalin's death in 1953; Kennedy, Khrushchev, and LBJ trying to reduce tensions after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; and Brezhnev and Carter aiming to sustain detente after the Helsinki Conference of 1975. All these leaders glimpsed possibilities for peace, yet they allowed ideologies, political pressures, the expectations of allies and clients, the dynamics of the international system, and their own fearful memories to trap them in a cycle of hostility that seemed to have no end.
Leffler's important book illuminates how Reagan, Bush, and, above all, Gorbachev finally extricated themselves from the policies and mind-sets that had imprisoned their predecessors, and were able to reconfigure Soviet-American relations after decades of confrontation. "With a keen eye for telling detail, a concern for the choices of individual leaders, and careful judgments, Leffler generates a narrative that carries the reader along as it develops important new ideas. This landmark study transcends many of our standard arguments about the Cold War to focus on what it was really about. Driving much of the maneuvering for security and advantage was the struggle over which political system could meet people's needs and produce a better society."--Robert Jervis, Columbia University "He tells a good story. Leffler explains in his introduction that "For the Soul of Mankind" is a narrative of five momentous Cold War episodes rather than a full history . . . the University of Virginia historian finds his voice in energetic examinations of the promising turmoil in the Politburo following Stalin's death in 1953, the near-Armageddon of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the erosion of detente in the Carter years and the end of the Cold War at the hands of Gorbachev, Reagan and George H. W. Bush."--Richard Rhodes, "The Washington Post
"""For the Soul of Mankind" assesses both what went wrong and what went right in America's diplomatic, military and political interactions with the Soviet Union during the thermonuclear stand-off of the cold war and] focuses loosely on several moments of tension between the American and Soviet leaders. They include the Truman-Stalin contest over occupied Germany, culminating in the Berlin airlift of 1948-49, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the tussle between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev over America's 'star wars' missile-shield programme in 1986. Mr. Leffler sees his book as 'a history of lost opportunities' when the cold war could plausibly have taken another course . . . The book succeeds in being even-handed: both sides come under careful scrutiny . . . Mr. Leffler believes in the importance of individuals and their decisions, even if only to understand how both become derailed. 'The cold war was not predetermined. Leaders made choices, ' he writes. And, at the end, the choices that mattered were Russian ones. He argues that though America shaped the nature of the contest, Gorbachev was the key figure in its ending. In contrast to such scholars as John Lewis Gaddis, Mr Leffler finds that 'Reagan was critically important, but Gorbachev was the indispensable agent of change' . . . his conclusion is powerful. He laments that all too often 'ideology and historical experience' intensified American leaders' sense of threat . . . At their best, American presidents maintained a delicate balance between power and restraint. They realised that they needed to achieve their goals not through war but through close co-ordination with allies. The book argues that, had they not lost this balance during periods of tension, they might have seen the opportunities hidden beneath the dangers. Although Mr. Leffler (wisely) leaves parallels to the present day implicit, he clearly has an important lesson to offer: a crisis is a terrible thing to waste. It makes unthinkable changes suddenly possible."--"The Economist
""Through a series of biographical sketches, Mr. Leffler presents a convincing case, showing how leaders such as Harry Truman and Josef Stalin defined national self-interest in ways that ensured conti
